Friday, July 13, 2007

Do you love Coffee???

I was walking back from school today and started thinking about a simple choice problem. Let me start with the basic set up and assumptions. Assume that we are all part of organization X. The members of the organization are myself, mano, meera, brainwaves, saumya, mindframes and survivor (others are welcome to join and should not change anything, except the division of the pie). Let us assume we have a big boss "M". We are all coffee lovers and at present the office does not have a coffee machine. The machine will cost the firm $ "c". Now "M" being the kind of guy he is, decides that he will buy the machine only if his staff (we) value the machine sufficiently to justify the expense. Not buying the coffee machine will not lead to any loss of productivity is an inherent assumption. Therefore the only decision driver for "M" is that we value the machine sufficiently.

Each one of us have private valuations for the machine. The valuation is not the cost of the machine but what is utility that the coffee machine gives me or you. In other words, if asked to contribute to buying the coffee machine, what is my willingness to pay for the machine. Let each of our potential contributions be "x with a subscript i representing each of us". "M" does not drink coffee and his decision rule is that the coffee maker is worth buying if and only if the sum of all the "x's" is greater than or equal to "c". In other words, if the sum of our individual contributions is greater than the cost of the machine, the machine will be bought. Hence what we think about our valuations is important in the outcome and each one of us prefers an outcome where the machine is bought.

Question: What can "M" do in this situation?

Solution 1: "M" can call each one of us privately to his room and ask us for what is our personal valuation. If the sum of our revealed valuation is greater than the cost, the machine is purhcased! Sounds good but there is a problem.

Remember that though we are asked for our valuations, we do not bear any cost. Therefore, one or all of us can inflate our true valuations, because our objective is to get the coffee machine and since inflating the valuation is not costly, the mechanism achieves the objective. "M" being a smart person himself decides that this is not effective and decides against this.

Solution 2: Suppose "M" decides that each one of us will make a contribution equivalent to our valuations and then if our total contribution exceed the cost, the machine will be purchased. Any excess cash collected can be used to purchase say beans. Is this solution optimal? Again it sounds good but there is a problem.

Let us assume here that we are good friends, but do not want to contribute more than an equal share. Also assume that we cannot collude. Therefore our private valuations are known only to us. Now it is possible that some of us might try to free ride on the others. Therefore there is a possibility of understating our true valuation, because we want the same benefit with a lower contribution, expecting another person to subsidize. Hence, again the situation leads to a failure. Therefore "M" rejects this.

What would be the best strategy that "M" can use to resolve this problem? Any suggestions? Is the problem interesting or would modifications be better?? I'm thinking about building examples which can probably be used for teaching design of management control systems (which is something that I want to teach at some point). I presume that such situations probably do arise in real life when there is a need to buy some goods in an organization which are useful collectively. If yes and you were part of it, please do share your experience on how it was solved.

7 comments:

Suresh Sankaralingam said...

Tolerate my ignorance...But, I dont understand the problem. It seems to me that, if enough people are interested, why cant they all get together and come up with a contribution Xi which is an equal split for a given coffee machine and ask 'M' if he can afford it. If not, and if there is a max-cap from the company's contribution, then the employees can split the cost and divide the shared cost equally among themselves? In other words, he can set a price $"c" and see how people respond. If people perceived a higher value, they might come forward to pay some extra amount to make the quality of the machine better... Am I making any sense?

Mad Max said...

@ Mindframes: You are making perfect sense here. The underlying assumption is each one of us do not want to play Xi but rather would pay Xi-ei, where ei is some arbitrary constant. However, since I know that you want to play only Xi-ei, I would want to pay no greater than Xi-ei. Otherwise I should be okie with subzidizing others. Such behavior is not allowed and each one of us want to maximize our benefits, implicity minimizing any cost. That is why I have the constraint that we cannot collude and our private valuations are not known.

Does this help?

Suresh Sankaralingam said...

I think I understand it now... I think some sort of controlled experiment can be used to determine individual's interest. Key variables that are of interest could be, quantity of coffee consumed (no. of times per day), price per cup of coffee one is willing to pay (quality of coffee), substitutes(?) etc., Based on that information, M could come up with a more objective way of determining each person's interest... I know that it is a stretch.. But, unless something can be done which would eliminate the bias and knowledge before hand of what M wants to do, it might be difficult to map individual's interest to money...

While typing it, I was thinking of this.. Might sound like a computer program..:)..M should start with a very high cost and ask people to divide..Naturally, not everyone is going to accept...In the second iteration, reduce the price by half and advertise it to the group which didnt accept the earlier proposal.. Do it till none of the people are left...May be, that can be used to determine the cost that an individual is willing to pay....:)...

Suresh Sankaralingam said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Mad Max said...

@ Mindframes: I like you second argument. The idea that M starts with some kind of iterative procedure. Now the bare bones sounds like some variant of the newton raphson technique for root finding. But, generally I like the idea. I have been thinking about a solution too. But I have not managed to come up with a foolproof "proof". I will share the idea here once I'm convinced there is no flaw in my argument. Also I will formally think about your proposition here. Intuitively, I like it.

Unknown said...

Ssup,
Why are you not putting the assumptions of free, open markets into practice: everyone has perfect information.
M will ask for an informal open meeting (just like open bidding). Everyone has to come up with their own demand. Individuals can not get free ride because they will reveal their true preference for free ride. Individuals will not over state their preferences because they do not want to pay higher. M comes to know the aggregate investment from individual contributions. If it is >= Cost, project proceeds or after a few iterations, the project is dropped.

By the way, it is presumptuous to assume M is a male.

Mad Max said...

@ Sham: ssup dude..nice to see to you after a long time...free markets is completely theoretical mate...there is not a single market in the world which is free...under free markets, the revelation principle applies to any message sent by any agent...hence we dont need a mechanism for optimal allocation...hence there is no need for us to even discuss optimal mechanisms...what say u????